The Effects of U.S. Tax Policy on the Income Repatriation Patterns of U.S. Multinational Corporations by Rosanne Altshuler & T. Scott Newlon
NBER WORKING PAPERS SERIES
THE EFFECTS OF U.S. TAX POLICY ON THE INCOME REPATRIATION
PATtERNSOF U. S. MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS
Rosanne Altshuler
P.Scott Newlon
Working Paper No. 3925




We are extremely grateful to GordonWilson for his assistance in
using the Treasury tax data. We thank Sheena McConnell. Joel
Slemrod, Glenn Hubbard, Harry Grubert. Bill Randolph. Dan Frisch,
Jim Poterba, the International Taxation Staff of the Office of
Tax Analysis and participants at the NBER Summer Institute
workshop on International Taxation for helpful discussions.
comments and suggestions. We are also grateful to RichardWood
and Rita Van Buren of Price Waterhouse for generously providing
us with data. This paper is part of NBER's research programin
Taxation. Any opinions expressed are those of the authors and
not those of the National Bureau of Economic Research or of the
U.S. Treasury Department.NEER Working Paper #3g25
December 1991
THE EFFECTS OF U.S. TAXPOLICYON ThE INCOME REPATRIATION
PATTERNS OF U.S. MULTINATIONALCORPORATIONS
ABSTRACT
U.S. corporations owe taxes to the U.S. Treasury on income
earned both inside and outside American borders. This paper
examines the incentives created by the U.S. tax system for the
legal avoidance of taxes on foreign source income. Using data
from 1986 corporate tax returns, we investigate the extent to
which U.S. corporations structure and coordinate remittances of
income from their foreign subsidiaries to reduce their U.S. and
foreign tax liabilities. In contrast to previous work in this
area, our estimates of the tax consequences of income remittances
from foreign subsidiaries to parent corporations explicitly take
into account the ability to use foreign tax credits generated
from one source of foreign income to offset the U.S. tax
liability generated by other sources of foreign income,
withholding tax rates on income remittances, variations in source
country corporate income tax systems, and dynamic aspects of the
U.S. tax system. Our findings indicate that U.S. multinationals
are able to take advantage of the U.S. tax system to avoid paying
much U.S. tax on their foreign source income.
Rosanne Altshuler T. Scott Newlon
Columbia University U.S. Department
Department of Economics of the Treasury
New York, Ny 10027 Office of TaxAnalysis
and NBER Main Treasury Building,
Room 5121
Washington, DC 20220I. INTRODUCTION
U.S. corporations earn a substantial portion of their income from
foreign sources. In 1986, the net foreign source income reported by U.S.
corporations on their U.S. tax returns was over $140 billion, which
amounted to over 52percentof their total net income) Both the United
States and the countries that are the source of this income generally assert
the right to tax this income. But U.S. tax policy attempts to some extent to
balance the U.S. tax claim against a desire to prevent double taxation. This
balance, and the overlapping tax claims that require it, complicates tax
collection by the United States and can open various avenues for tax
avoidance by U.S. multinational corporations. Such tax avoiding behavior
would reduce U.S. tax revenue and could distort international financial flows
and the international allocation of investment by U.S. corporations. An
important policy question is to what extent these incentives for tax avoidance
actually affect the behavior of U.S. corporations and reduce tax revenue.
This paper attempts to address that question by examining the impact of tax
incentives on the way in which U.S. corporations structure and coordinate
remittances of income from their foreign subsidiaries.2
This study uses new data from 1986 U.S. corporate income tax
returns to examine the effects of taxes on the patterns of remittances of
income from foreign subsidiaries to (heir U.S. parent corporations. We
focus on the behavioral effects of three important features of the U.S. tax
treatment of foreign source income. The first feature is the deferral of tax
on the income of foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations until theincome
is remitted to the United States. The second is the credit allowed against
U.S. tax for foreign taxes already paid on foreign source income. The third
is the limitation of the foreign tax credit so that it does not exceed the U.S.
tax otherwise payable on foreign source income and therefore cannot reduce
U.S. tax on domestic income. We are particularly interested in the effects2
on income repatriation patterns of the global or overall limitation that is
allowed under U.S. tax law. The overall limitation allows the use of foreign
tax credits generated from one source of income to offset the U.S. tax
liability generated by other sources of foreign income.
Several previous studies have used aggregate data to investigate the
effect of taxation on the income repatriation activity of multinationals.
Kopits (1972) used U.S. tax data aggregated by country to estimate a
dividend payout equation for payments from foreign subsidiaries to their
U.S. parent corporations. In a subsequent study, Kopits (1976) used U.S.
tax data aggregated by country and industry to estimate the effects of
taxation on royalty remittances from foreign subsidiaries. Using aggregate
data on U.S. foreign direct investment, Hartman (1981), Boskin and Gale
(1987), Newlon (1987), Slemrod (1990a), and Jun (1990) all estimated tax
effects on the retention of earnings by the foreign affiliates of U.S.
companies and/or the U.S. affiliates of foreign companies. A fundamental
problem with all of these studies is that the complex incentives provided by
the tax system cannot necessarily be captured using aggregate data. For
example, tax incentive effects on income repatriations from individual
subsidiaries in the same country can vary depending upon the global tax
situation of their respective parents.
Only a few studies have used micro data to examine the effect of
taxes on income repatriation by multinational companies. Mutti (1981)
appears to be the earliest study. He used U.S. tax return data from 1972 to
estimate the effect of tax costs on the choice of income remittance channels.
Significant tax effects were found in estimates of a dividend equation using
the underlying micro data. Using financial accounting data for the foreign
affiliates of British companies, Alworth (1988) estimated dividend equations.
He found significant effects of tax cost variables on dividend payout3
behavior. Both Goodspeed and Frisch (1989) and Hines and Hubbard (1990)
used 1984 tax return data of a sample of U.S. corporations and their foreign
subsidiaries to investigate tax effects on their income remittances.
Goodspeed and Frisch (1989) matched data on parent corporations with
country specific information on their foreign subsidiaries in an attempt to
quantify income repatriation incentives created by the U.S. tax system. By
further disaggregating the 1984 tax return data, Hines and Hubbard (1990)
were able to study income repatriation behavior using a data set that matched
foreign subsidiary specific information to parent corporation data. Both
studies found significant evidence of tax effects.
We improve on and extend the previous micro-data studies in three
respects. First, we use the most recently available tax return data for a large
sample of U.S. corporations and their foreign subsidiaries. Second, our
specification of the tax cost of income remittances from abroad more
accurately reflects the tax incentives facing firms. For example, unlike
Alworth (1988), we use actual company tax data to calculate the tax
incentives facing firms. While Goodspeed and Frisch (1989) employ foreign
subsidiary data that is aggregated by country, we use a similar data set to
Hines and Hubbard (1990) that matches subsidiary specific information with
parent corporation tax information. Unlike Hines and Hubbard (1990), when
measuring tax incentives we incorporate the withholding taxes most firms
face on remittances of foreign income and we account for some important
variations in source country corporate income tax systems. Finally, we
investigate some of the dynamic aspects of the U.S. taxation of foreign
source income. We attempt to reflect these dynamics in our econometric
estimates of dividend remittance equations.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
describes the basic structure of the U.S. tax treatment of the foreign income4
of U.S. corporations and discusses how this system may affect income
repatriation incentives and the consequent policy concerns. Section III
specifies the taxprices thatU.S. multinational corporations pay for income
remittances from their foreign subsidiaries. These tax prices measure the
change in a multinational's tax liabilities caused by an incremental increase
in income payments from its foreign subsidiary. Section IV discusses the tax
return data used in this study. Section V presents the results of our analysis
of the income remittance patterns of the corporations in our sample. The
final section attempts to draw some policy implications from the results.
II. U.S. TAX POLICY TOWARDS FOREIGN INCOME
When a U.S. corporation earns profits from its operations in a
foreign country the source country usually gets the first crack at those profits
through its corporate income tax. The source country may also levy
withholding taxes on remittances of income out of the country in the form
of payments such as of dividends, interest, rents, fees, and royalties. Like
the United States, some countries also levy an additional tax on the profits
of branches of foreign companies on top of the ordinary corporate income
tax .
I!.!Deferral
Thetime at which the U.S Treasury first taxes foreign profits
depends on the way in which the foreign operation is organized. If it is
organized as a branchofthe U.S. corporation, i.e., it is not separately
incorporated, then the United States taxes the profits as they accrue. If it is
organized as a subsidiary,meaningit is separately incorporated in the
foreign country, then the profits are not generally taxed until they areS
remitted to the U.S. parent corporation. This delay in taxation until a
subsidiary's profits are actually remitted to the United States is known as
deferral.
The deferral of taxation on income earned by foreign subsidiaries
is an important and controversial aspect of U.S. tax policy. Deferral gives
firms an incentive to accumulate profits in low-tax jurisdictions rather than
repatriating them to the United States. Deferral is particularly relevant in
this study because our data provide detailed information on the foreign
subsidiaries of a sample of U.S. corporations. We do not have detailed
information on their foreign branch operations.
Deferral has been attacked for allowing U.S. multinational
corporations to avoid U.S. taxes on foreign income by retaining it abroad in
low-tax, or tax haven, jurisdictions and, as a consequence, favoring foreign
direct investment over domestic investment. The tax code does contain
restrictions that hamper the ability of multinationals to permanently avoid tax
payments on overseas income held in subsidiaries. The Subpart F provisions
of the tax code restrict deferral on certain types of unrepatriated subsidiary
income by treating it as if it was distributed as a dividend. In general, under
Subpart F, income that accrues from a subsidiary's passive ownership of
assets (called passive bEcome)isdenied deferral and taxed immediately. On
the other hand, income earned from the conduct of a business (called active
income) is generally not subject to the Subpart F rules and is allowed
deferral.
11.2The foreign tax credit
The United States attempts to reduce the possibility that foreign
source income could be taxed twice by allowing a credit against U.S. taxes
for taxes levied by the source country. The foreign tax credit has two6
components. The first, called the directcredit,is a credit for foreign taxes
paid directly on income as it is received by a U.S. taxpayer. Foreign taxes
eligible for the direct credit include withholding taxes on remittances to the
U.S. taxpayer such as dividends, interest, and royalties, and also income
taxes on foreign branch operations. The second component, called the
indirect or deemed-paid credit, is a credit for foreign income taxes paid on
the income out of which a distribution is made to the U.S. taxpayer. The
deemed-paid credit is available to the U.S. corporate shareholders of a
foreign corporation who own at least 10 percent of the voting stock of the
foreign corporation.
We wit! outline briefly how the deemed-paid credit works. Suppose
subsidiary i makes a dividend payment, D,, to its U.S. parent corporation.
Since this is a distribution of profits after foreign tax, the United States
considers the taxable income arising from this dividend to be the dividend
grossed up by the foreign tax deemed paid on that dividend. The grossed up
dividend is
D1 +T1D1/(Y1-T), (1)
where T1 denotes the total foreign income tax paid by subsidiary i and Y1
denotes the subsidiary's pre-tax income from the U.S. perspective, which is
the subsidiary's book earnings and profits.4 Equation (1)can be rewritten
in a way that may be more familiar to economistsas D1/(1-r1), where r
represents the average subsidiary tax rate, T/Y, on foreign earnings from
the U.S. perspective. The U.S. tax on the dividend before thedeemed-paid
credit is rD1/(1-r.), where i-denotesthe U.S. rate of tax. The United States
considers that creditable foreign tax was paid on the dividend in the amount
of r1D1/(1-r1). The U.S. tax liabilityon the dividend payment is therefore
D1(r-rj/(l -r1).7
Theamount of foreign tax credit that can actually be used is limited,
however, to the amount of U.S. tax payable on foreign income. Therefore,
if the foreign tax rate, r1, exceeds the U.S. tax rate, r, excess credits are
created in the amount of D,(r1-r)/(1-r.J. If the foreign tax rate is less than
the U.S. tax rate, then a U.S. tax liability of D1Ø—Ta/(1-) accrues and the
remitted foreign income is said to be creating excesslimitation.
11.3TheOverallLimitation and Cross-crediting
As noted in the introduction, the limitation on the foreign tax credit
operates to some extent on an overall basis. This means that excess credits
accruing from one source of foreign income can often be used to offset U.S.
tax (excess limitation) on foreign income from another source.5 We call this
cross-crediting or averaging of foreign income.
Cross-crediting or averaging of foreign income can take three
forms. First, U.S. taxpayers can cross-credit by receiving simultaneous
dividend remittances from subsidiaries in high-tax-rate and low-tax-rate
countries. Second, cross-crediting can occur between income types that tend
to incur relatively high foreign taxes (dividends or branch income) and
income types that incur lower foreign taxes (e.g., interest, rents, and
royalties). Third, cross-crediting can occur over time using foreign tax
credit carryovers. We will discuss the third type of cross-crediting in more
detail below.
The ability to cross-credit can reduce U.S. tax revenue from foreign
source income. It may also affect the incentives for income repatriation and
the incentive to invest abroad. For example, if a U.S. corporation is in an
excess limitation position--i.e., the U.S. tax liability on its foreign source
income is greater than its supply of foreign tax credits--then any income it
derives from a low-tax subsidiary faces additional U.S. tax. The same total8
amount of tax is paid as would be on U.S. source income. Consequently,
the tax rate differential between the United States and the foreign country
does not distort the allocation of capital by U.S. corporations in favor of the
low-Lax country--i.e., capital export neutrality is preserved.6 However, if
the U.S. corporation is in excess credit, say because it has income derived
from a high-tax country, the excess credits may offset any additional U.S.
tax on the income from the low-tax country. In this case capital export
neutrality may be violated, because investment in the low-tax country will
be tax favored over investment in the U.S. or in high-tax countries. On the
other hand, cross-crediting may move the tax system closer to capital export
neutrality. This is because capital export neutrality does not hold unless
corporations that invest in high-tax countries receive refunds from the U.S.
government for the difference between taxes paid at home and taxes paid to
host countries with high average tax rates. With the overall limitation, firms
that have the ability to average high- and low-taxed foreign source income
will be more willing to undertake investments in high-tax countries, all else
equal, than they would be under a per country limitation where cross-
crediting is only permitted for income derived from the same country.
Therefore, under our current tax system, whether or not capital export
neutrality holds depends on the credit position or averaging potential of the
multinational. Excess credit parents favor investments in low-tax locations
over investments in high-tax locations (violating capital export neutrality),
while excess limitation parents face the same U.S. tax rateon foreign
investment projects regardless of their location (preserving capitalexport
neutrality).'
Such revenue and efficiency considerations have made the
appropriate form for the limitation on the foreign tax credit the subject of
policy debate in the past. Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, movement9
to a per country limitation was proposed in the Treasury tax reform proposal
(Treasury (1984)) and the President's tax reform proposal (Treasury (1985)).
Butthedesire to restrict cross-crediting has instead been pursued through the
application of separate limitations to baskets of different types of foreign
income. Before the 1986 Act, the period which our study covers, there were
five separate baskets: (1) one for investment interest income, (2) one for
Domestic rnternational Sales Corporation dividend income,8 (3) one for the
foreign trade income of a Foreign Sales Corporation,9 (4) another for
distributions from a Foreign Sales Corporation, and (5) one for all other
foreign source income, which we will call general limitation income. The
1986 Act decreased the potential for cross-crediting further by increasing the
number of separate limitation baskets to nine. Since the 1986 Act, various
parties have argued for reductions in the number of baskets, generally on
grounds of simplicity or competitiveness concerns.'0
Taxpayers are permitted to carry excess foreign tax credits back up
to two years or forward up to five years to offset U.S. tax on other foreign
source income. As noted above, these carryovers effectively allow taxpayers
to cross-credit over time. They also mean that the "true' foreign tax credit
position of a taxpayer--excess credit or excess limitation--in a given year,
and consequently the tax effect of a remittance of foreign income in that
year, may differ from what it appears to be. For example, if a taxpayer is
currently in excess limitation, then it would appear that a dividend payment
from a subsidiary in a low-tax (i.e. lower than U.S. tax rate) country would
incur an additional U.S. tax. But if the U.S. taxpayer will move into excess
credit next year, then the dividend payment may incur no additional U.S.
tax," since next year's excess credits can be carried back to offset taxes
paid in the current year.10
IlLTHE TAX PRICE OF SUBSIDIARY INCOME
REMITTANCES
To measure the influence of taxation on income flows within U.S.
multinational corporations, we derive tax prices for income remittances from
subsidiaries to their U.S. parent corporations. We define the tax price as the
additional tax liability arising from an incremental dollar's worth of income
remittance. The tax price of sending income back to the United States
depends on the foreign tax credit position of the U.S. parent--whether it is
in excess credit or excess limitation--and the channel used to remit the
income. We can differentiate broadly between the dividend channel, and
channels for which the remittance is tax deductible in the source country,
such as interest, royalties, and rents. While dividends are not tax deductible
in the source country, they do get the deemed-paid foreign tax credit in the
United States.This section presents first the tax prices for dividend
remittances and then the tax prices for other forms of remittances.
111.1The Tax Price of Dividend Remittances
The tax price of remitting income through dividend payments
depends not only on tax rates, but also on the source country's system for
taxing corporate income. Our specification of the tax price of dividend
payments is similar to that of Alworth (1988)12 and Hines and Hubbard
(1990); however, as noted in the introduction, it differs in a few important
respects. Unlike Alworth (1988), we use actual tax return data to calculate
the average tax rate for the deemed-paid credit. Unlike Hines and Hubbard
(1990), we incorporate withholding taxes, which can be significant in
magnitude,'3 and we account for divergences from the classical system of
corporate income taxation by some important countries in the sample such
as the United Kingdom, Germany and Japan.11
For purposes of specifying a tax price for dividend remittances, the
countries in our sample can be classified into three different categories on the
basis of their corporate income tax systems: classical systems, split-rate
systems, and imputation systems. We discuss the tax price of dividend
remittances from subsidiaries under each of these systems below.
III. 1.1 Under classical systems
Under a classical corporate income tax system the only source
country tax consequences of a dividend remittance arise from withholding
taxes. The source country tax liability for subsidiary i can be defined as
T1 =r1Y+ w1D1, (2)
where w denotes the withholding tax rate in the subsidiary's country for
dividends paid abroad and the other variables are as defined above. The
foreign taxes creditable against U.S. tax liability are deemed-paid taxes plus
withholding taxes, or
r1D1/(1-r.) + co1D1. (3)
If theU.S.parent is in excess credit, any U.S. tax liability on the
dividend is offset by excess credits, so
T5 =0. (4)
And, of course, the U.S. tax price of a dividend remittance is simply
dT5/dD1 =0. (5)
If the U.S. parent is in excess limitation, then the U.S. tax liability deriving
from the dividend payment is
T5 =D1((r-rj/(1-rj -w1}. (6)
The U.S. tax cost of remitting an additional dollar of dividend is
dT5/dD1 =(r-rJ/(l-r..)-Wi. (7)
Note that this expression is negative if the source country average tax rate
exceeds the U.S. tax rate or if the amount by which the U.S. rate exceeds12
the foreign rate is more than offset by the effect of the withholding tax. In
that case a dividend payment actually reduces the firm's total U.S. tax
liability because it creates excess credits that can be used to offset U.S. tax
on other foreign income.
The global tax effects of a dividend remittance for the firm are
simply the sum of its source country and U.S. tax effects.
T =T5+w1D1. (8)
If the parent is in excess credit, this expression reduces to
T6 =w1D, (9)
because the payment of source country withholding tax does not result in any
offsetting reduction in U.S. taxes. The tax price is simply
dTG/dD = (10)
If the parent is in excess limitation, the global tax effect is
=D(r-ra/(1-r1), (11)
andthe tax price of an additional dollar of dividend remittance is
dT/dD1 =(r-r.3I(1-r.3. (12)
Thisexpression is negative if the source country tax rate exceeds the U.S.
tax rate, because the additional credits created by the dividend remittance are
used to reduce U.S. tax on other foreign income. The withholding tax has
no net effect because the extra withholding tax paid on the remittance is
offset by a reduction in U.S. tax of an equal amount. For reference, the tax
prices we have derived are summarized in Table 1.
We have ignored the effect of the foreign tax credit carryover in the
derivation of these tax prices. If the parent firm's foreign tax credit position
changes during the period over which foreign tax credits can be carried
forward or back, then the trueS credit position differs from the position on the
books. This means that itmay be more appropriate to specify the tax price
as an expected price that incorporates the probability of changing credit13
position. Table 1 indicates the direction of the potential error introduced by
ignoring the carryover potential of foreign tax credits.
111.1 .2 Under split-rate systems
Several major countries have split-rate corporate tax systems,
including Germany'4 and Japan. Under these tax systems, distributed
profits are taxed at a different, usually lower, rate than undistributed profits.
The derivation of the tax price of dividend remittances is much more
complicated in this case because the average foreign tax rate, and hence the
dividend gross-up and the foreign tax credit, vary with the level of dividend
payments. We leave the derivations of the tax prices to Appendix A and
present only the results here.
Where the source country has a split-rate system, let i-0andrd
denote its tax rate on undistributed and distributed profits, respectively. If
the U.S. parent is in excess credit, the U.S. tax price of an incremental
dividend remittance is still zero, because excess credits offset any additional
U.S. tax liability that would otherwise arise on remitted foreign source
income. If the U.S. parent is in excess limitation, then the U.S. tax price
of an incremental dividend remittance is
dT5/dD1 =(r-r.J/(1-rj-w÷(DI/YJfrU-rd)(1-r)/(1-732. (13)
Note that this is the same expression as derived for the classical system but
with one additional term. The extra term will be positive if distributed
profits are taxed at a lower rate than undistributed profits. This increases the
U.S. tax price of a dividend distribution because increased dividend
distributions lower foreign tax payments and thereby decrease the deemed-
paid credit.
When the parent is in excess limitation, the global tax price of
dividend payments is14
dT0/dD1 =(r-r.3/(1-rj+Td - r+ (D1/Y.J(r-ra(1-r)/(1-r1)2.(14)
This expression hastwo additionalterms. One of the terms has already been
discussed above. The other, ;-r,representsthe net effect of the dividend
payment on source country corporate tax payments. For a parent in excess
credit, the global taxpriceof a dividend payment is
dT0/dD =- TI +w1. (15)
This price also includes the effect of the dividend payment on source country
corporate tax payments. The tax prices we have derived for subsidiaries in
countries with split-rate corporate income tax systems are also summarized
in Table 1.
IlL 1.3 Under imputation systems
A number of countries partially or hilly integrate the taxation of
corporations and their shareholders through imputation systems. However,
the tax credits generally provided to shareholders under these systems for the
corporate income tax already paid on distributed profits are not usually
extended to foreign direct investors. Only the United Kingdom, under the
terms of its tax treaty with the United States, provides a partial credit to
U.S. direct investors for its Advanced Corporation Tax (ACT). In the other
countries with imputation systems, such tax credits are not provided to U.S.
direct investors, and the incentive effects of the tax system on dividend
remittances to the U.S. are the same as they would be under a classical
corporate tax system)5
As under split-rate systems, the tax price of a dividend remittance
to a U.S. shareholder is complex because the avenge tax rate used to
determine the dividend gross-up and the foreign tax credit varies with the
level of the dividend. We leave the detailed derivation of this tax price to
Appendix A and present the results here.15
Under the U.S.-U.K. tax treaty, the tax credit provided to U.S.
shareholders for ACT on distributed profits is one half of the credit given
domestic shareholders. The United Kingdom applies its withholding tax to
both the dividend payment and the ACT credit. The United States considers
the tax credit paid to be part of the grossed-up dividend. In addition, for
foreign tax credit purposes the United States treats the reduction by one half
in the credit given to U.S. shareholders as an additional payment of U.K.
corporate income tax by the U.K. subsidiary.
If we denote the tax credit given to U.S. shareholders for ACT as
01, then for U.S. parents in excess limitation, the U.S. tax price to the parent
of a dividend remittance from a U.K. subsidiary is
dT/dD1 =(1+0j{(r-ra/(1-r,) -- 01(D1IY)(I-r)/(1-rô2}.(16)
If the U.S. parent is in excess credit, then the U.S. tax price to the parent
is zero.
The global tax price for a parent in excess limitation is
dT0/dD1= (l+Oa{(r—r.)/(1-r.)-O(D/Ya(1-)/(1-rj2}-U.(17)
If the U.S. parent is in excess credit, then the global tax price is
dT0/dD1 =(1+0.)w -U. (18)
The third panel of Table 1 summarizes the tax prices we have derived for
subsidiaries in countries with imputation systems.
111.2The Tax Price for Tax-deductible Remittances
Rent, royalty and interest payments from subsidiaries to their U.S.
parent corporations are generally deductible against corporate income tax in
the source country.'6 Each dollar remitted through one of these channels
therefore saves ,dollarsin source country tax, although there is likely also
to be a withholding tax on such payments. At the same time, there is no
deemed-paid credit for such payments. This leads to the following tax16
prices. If the U.S. parent is in excess limitation, the net global tax price of
a remittance is r-r1.Ifthe parent is in excess credit, the tax price is w-r.
Multinationals generally have an incentive to receive income
remittances from subsidiaries facing high source country tax rates in one of
the tax deductible forms, rather than in the form of dividends. A tax
deductible remittance decreases source country tax payments directly,
whereas dividend payments might only produce unusable excess credits. If
withholding tax rates on the tax-deductible forms of payment are not
substantially higher than they are on dividends, the incentive to make
payments in these tax-deductible forms is especially strong when the parent
is in excess credit. The excess credits can be used to offset any residual
U.S. tax on these payments, and the dominant effect is the deductibility of
the payments against source country taxes.
IV. THE DATA
To comply with U.S. tax law, U.S. multinationals must file a
number of tax and information forms We created a data set from
information obtained from three sets of these forms filed by U.S. taxpayers
in 1986:corporate income tax returns filed by non-financial U.S.
corporations", called 1120 forms; forms filed in support of foreign tax
credits claimed, called 1118 forms; and information returns, called 5471
forms, filed for each Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC) controlled by
a U.S. taxpayer. A CFC is a foreign corporation that is at least 50 percent
owned by a group of U.S. shareholders each of whom have at least a 10
percent interest in the company. The 1120 form contains firm-specific tax
return data which includes U.S. taxable income, U.S. taxes paid, tax credits
claimed and balance sheet and income statement items. Information on
foreign source income, foreign taxes paid and foreign tax credits claimed by17
foreign tax credit basket is reported on Form 1118. This form also provides
us with data on foreign source income and foreign taxes paid for the general
limitation income basket which is the focus of this study. The CFC data
from Form 5471 includes balance sheet and income statement variables along
with detailed information on remittances to U.S. parent corporations.
Ourfullsample contains 617 U.S. parent corporations, 277 of
which had non-positive worldwide income in 1986.Each parent in our
sample controlled at least one CFC and filed an 1118 form to claim a foreign
tax credit in the general limitation income basket)9 In relation to the entire
universe of non-financial corporations, our sample contains only 31 percent
of total assets. However, ninety-two percent of foreign tax credits in 1986
are claimed by parents in our sample and this fraction increases to ninety-
five percent if we consider only manufacturing parents. The majority of the
parents in the sample were in the manufacturing industry (71.5 percent),
followed by retail trade (11.2 percent), transportation (7.9 percent), services
(5.0 percent), mining (2.6 percent), construction (1.5 percent) and
agriculture (0.3 percent).
The CFC data set provides information detailing income remittances
to U.S. parent corporations for the top 7,500 CFCs in terms of asset size in
1986. The U.S. parent corporations in our sample accounted for 6,121 of
these large CFCs. Compared to the entire set of subsidiaries owned by our
parents, these 6,121 CFCs accounted for 91.5 percent of assets and 93.0
percent of earnings and profits both before and after taxes.
Calculating CFC specific tax prices for income remittances requires
knowledge of both the appropriate foreign corporate tax rate and the
withholding tax rate. We used the CFC's average foreign tax rate (foreign
tax payments divided by before-tax earnings and profits both taken from
Form 5471) to measure the rate r1atwhich dividends are grossed-up and18
foreign tax credits created. Under some circumstances, calculating the
average tax rate in this manner may lead to an unsatisfactory approximation
of r.Inparticular, problems arise when CFCs report negative earnings and
profits, receive tax refunds from host countries, repatriate dividends in
excess of current earnings and profits, and receive dividends from
subsidiaries of their own. Appendix B describes how we handled CFCs in
those situations.
Foreign withholding taxes on dividend remittances can affect the
overalltax costof repatriations and were therefore included in our tax price
specification. We used the Price Waterhouse guides and tax treaties to
develop a list of country specific withholding tax rates for 1986. The Price
Waterhouse guides also provided the appropriate statutory tax rates for the
countries in our sample with split rate and imputation tax systems.
V. RESULTS
V.1Tax Payments and Income Remittance Patterns
Table 2 presents summary information on the income of the 340
U.S. parent corporations in our sample that had positive taxable income and
the taxes that they paid. The columns of the tablepresent figures for the
number of U.S. corporations in our sample and the book value of their
assets, their U.S. total taxable income, the total U.S. taxes they paid after
tax credits, their foreign source income, the U.S. taxes they paid on foreign
source income, and the average U.S. tax rate on their foreign source income.
The rows of the tablepresent totals for all U.S. parent corporations in the
sample, industry totals, and totals for firms in excess limitation and excess
credit, respectively.
Table 2 shows that U.S. tax collections on foreign source income
varied considerably by industry inour sample. Corporations in agriculture,19
transportation, and, to a lesser extent, service industries paid more U.S.
taxes on their foreign source income than companies in the other industries
we consider.2' For example, the average U.S. tax paid on a dollar of
income earned abroad was over 33 cents in the agricultural and
transportation industries but less than 3 cents in manufacturing industries.
The fact that corporations in the transportation and service industries pay
lower foreign taxes on their foreign source income and consequently have
higher U.S. tax liabilities on that income is unsurprising. In many countries
income from the transportation and services activities of foreign companies
is exempt from tax or lightly taxed, either as a matter of domestic law or as
a consequence of tax treaty provisions.
Table 2 also shows that despite industry variation, most of the
foreign source income of the U.S. parent corporations in the sample bore
little U.S. tax. For the sample as a whole, foreign source income was a
large percentage (59.0 percent) of total U.S. taxable income, but the U.S.
taxes paid on this income were small, both as a percentage of total U.S.
taxes paid (10.7 percent) and as a percentage of foreign source income (3.4
percent). Apparently the U.S. corporations in the sample were able to offset
most potential U.S. tax liability on their foreign source income with credits
for the foreign taxes they paid, or were deemed to have paid, on that
income. This was definitely the case for those U.S. parents that were in
excess credit, and although most (62 percent) of the U.S. parents in the
sample were in excess limitation, most (69 percent) of the foreign source
income accrued to firms in excess credit. Even the U.S. parents in excess
limitation paid relatively little U.S. tax on their foreign source income, since
the average U.S. tax rate on that income was less than 11 percent.
The fact that most of the foreign source income of these firms bore
little U.S. tax did not necessarily result from specific tax avoidance activities20
on their part. It could have arisen simply because tax rates were high in the
jurisdictions in which most foreign income was earned, and hence firms that
received substantial foreign source income were likely to be in excess credit.
Table 3 presents some evidence bearing on this point.
Table 3 presents information for CFCs associated with parents that
had positive worldwide income in 1986. CFCs are split into two groups:
those with U.S. parents in excess limitation and those with U.S; parents in
excess credit. Within each of these groups the CFCs are classified by the
avenge foreign tax rate they faced. The columns of Table 3 present
information on CFC assets, CFC after-foreign-tax earnings, and the different
forms of U.S. taxable foreign source income the parent corporations derived
from the CFC5. Although our original sample contained 6,121 CFCs,
1 ,646 were associated with parents that had tax losses in 1986. Of the
remaining 4,475CFCs,3,410 had sufficient information to calculate average
foreign tax rates and are therefore included in Table 3. As mentioned in
Section IV and detailed in Appendix B, in some circumstances we did not
have the appropriate information to calculate a CFC specific tax rate.
The table shows that the assets and after-tax earnings of CFCs in the
sample are distributed unevenly across foreign tax rates for both excess
credit and excess limitation parents. There are concentrations of assets and
earnings in the lowest (less than 20 percent) and middle (30-50 percent) tax
rate ranges. This suggests that the parent corporations' low U.S. tax
liabilities on foreign income may be due more to cross-crediting than to
generally high foreign tax rates.
Table 3 shows that CFC dividend payments were distributed across
foreign tax rates in much the same way as CFC earnings and assets. This
indicates that there may be significant cross-crediting occurring, but it is not
clear whether it is by design or simply due to the distribution of tax rates on21
the earnings of these CFCs. The table does show some evidence of tax
influences on dividend remittances. First, CFCs with parents in excess
credit pay out relatively more as a percentage of assets or earnings than do
other CFCs. One would expect this, since dividend payments from those
CFCs incur no additional U.S. tax. Second, dividend remittances of high-tax
CFCs of excess limitation parents generally bear a negative tax price, and
those CFCs do pay out much more in relation to their earnings than do other
CFCs of excess limitation parents. However, this last result does not hold
when dividend payments are expressed as a percentage of CFC assets.
Furthermore, one might expect high-tax CFCs of parents in excess limitation
to have higher payout ratios than CFCs with parents in excess credit --since
in the former case the tax price of a dividend remittance is generally negative
while in the latter case it is at least zero —butthe figures in Table 3 suggest
otherwise.
Table 3 does not provide any conclusive evidence for substantial tax
influences on CFC dividend remittance patterns.But it should be
remembered that we have ignored withholding taxes and variations in host
country corporate tax systems here. As we show below, these turn out to
be important.
Evidence that U.S. multinational corporations use different channels
for income remittances in order to reduce their global tax liabilities is
provided in Table 3. Remitting income through the interest, rents and
royalties channels instead of the dividend channel takes advantage of the
deductibility of such payments against the CFC's taxes. Therefore, we
would expect to see relatively more of these forms of remittances from CFCs
facing high source country tax rates.Table 3 shows that pattern of
remittances. Relatively more interest, rents and royalties were paid from the
CFCs with higher foreign tax rates than from those with lower foreign tax22
rates--although there is some concentration of payments in the lowest tax rate
range. When these remittances are measured in relation to CFC assets or
earnings the concentration in the upper tax rate ranges appears particularly
pronounced. CFCs with parents in excess credit also remitted substantially
more income in these tax deductible forms than did those with parents in
excess limitation. This makes sense, since these firms are effectively
avenging the excess credits created from other sources of foreign income to
offset the additional U.S. tax liability generally created by interest, rent and
royalty payments.23
The distribution of Subpart F income by CFC tax rate shown in
Table 3 illustrates the value of deferral to U.S. multinational corporations.
The vast majority of this income was accounted for by CFCs facing low tax
rates. Although there is no deferral for Subpart F income, Subpart F income
may be earned on passiveinvestmentsof retained activeCFCincome that
doesbenefitfrom deferral. U.S. multinationals may choose to retain this
active income in low-tax jurisdictions, and earn Subpart F incomeon it, until
such time as excess credits are available from elsewhere to offset the residual
U.S. tax liability that would accrue if the active incomewere sent back to
the United States immediately.
V.2Cross-crediting
Table 3 shows that the most important channel for income
remittances from CFCs was through dividendpayments. Dividend payments
made up about 62 percent of the total foreign income derivedby U.S.
parents from the CFCs in the sample. And this understates the importance
of dividends in the net receipts of theparent, since they are paid out of after-
foreign-tax income, and so get the deemed-paid credit, while interest,rents,
and royalties are paid out of pre-foreign-tax income and do notget the23
deemed-paid credit. Therefore, much of the scope for tax minimization by
U.S. parents may lie in coordinating CFC dividend payments properly. CFC
dividend payment levels should also be more easy to change in the short run
than the levels of interest, royalties, and rents. So dividends are particularly
suitable for taking advantage of the ability to cross-credit provided by the
overall limitation on the foreign tax credit. The question is how much U.S.
corporations do use dividend payments in this way to reduce their tax
liabilities given that other factors may drive dividend remittance patterns as
well.
Table 4 partitions the data in a way that may indicate the potential
for cross-crediting through concurrent dividend payments from CFCs facing
different levels of foreign taxation, and, to some extent, how much of that
potential is realized. For this table, CFCs are classified as high-tax if their
average foreign tax rate is greater than or equal to the U.S. statutory rate in
1986 (46 percent) and as low-tax otherwise. Dividends from a high-tax CFC
would tend to create excess credits or offset U.S. tax on other foreign source
income, while dividends from a low-tax CFC would tend to create a U.S.
tax liability or absorb excess foreign tax creditsY As was the case with
Table 3, to construct this table we had to eliminate CFCs for which we did
not have sufficient information to calculate avenge tax rates. Parents that
did not control any CFCs for which we could compute an average tax rate
were eliminated from the sample. As a result our original sample of 340
parents with positive worldwide income was reduced to 290 parents. Of the
290 parent firms in the new sample, 212, or about 73 percent, had both
high-tax and low-tax CFCs in our sample; these U.S. parents therefore had
the potential to cross-credit through concurrent dividend payments from high-
and low-tax CFCs. The table also shows that most (54.4 percent) of the
parents receiving dividends received them from both high- and low-tax24
CFCs, and these parents accounted for the bulk (93.7 percent) of dividends
received. Clearly, most of the parents with the potential to cross-credit did
so, at least to some extent. About 17 percent of the parents receiving
dividends from CFCs had both high- and low-tax CFCs, but received
dividend payments only from their high-tax CFCs. However, these
dividends accounted for only 1.6 percent of total dividends received by U.S.
parents in the sample. The bottom two rows of Table 4 provide information
on parents that had both high- and low-tax CFCs but received dividends only
from their low-tax CFCs. These parents accounted for 12.7percent of all
parents, but only 1.8 percent of total dividends received by parents from
CFCs. In addition, the bottom row shows that about two thirds of those
dividends were received by parents with foreign tax creditcarryovers that
they could use to offset at least some of the additional U.S. tax liability that
might otherwise arise on the dividend remittances!5
In addition to cross-crediting through concurrent remittances of
foreign income from differently taxed sources, firms can use the ability to
carry foreign tax credits back two years and forward five years to cross-
credit over time.It appears that the use of these carryovers is not
insignificant. The U.S. corporations in our sample carried over $4 billion
worth of foreign tax credits into 1986 from previous years! About 40
percent of these carryovers were used to offset U.S. tax on foreign source
income in 1986.
We carmot measure the full extent of cross-crediting over time
because we do not have data on the amount ofexcess foreign tax credits
created in 1986 which were carried back to offset tax liabilities inprevious
years or forward to offset tax in the future. (Note that a carryover created
in 1986 would not have expired before1991). We do know, however, that
foreign tax credit carryovers could only be of use to a firm in excess credit25
in 1986 if that firm was in excess limitation for at least one of the previous
two years or moved into excess limitation before 1991. In general, the more
frequently firms change their credit position, the more likely they are to be
able to use these carryovers. In an effort to determine to what extent firms
move between excess credit and excess limitation, we created a panel data
set from tax return data for a sample of U.S. corporations. Unfortunately,
data from foreign tax credit forms is only compiled in even years and was
available to us only for the years 1980, 1982, 1984 and 1986. In addition,
U.S. corporations generally file foreign tax credit forms only in years in
which they claim a credit and, as a result, the data are missing for parents
withnon-positiveworldwide income. In an effort to obtain the largest
number of observations, we created three data sets that match tax returns
over three year periods. There were 449 U.S. corporations in the sample
that linked the 1980 and 1982 tax returns, 388 in the sample that linked 1982
and 1984 returns and 317 in the sample that linked returns from 1984 and
1986.
Table S presents our estimates of the percent of firms that switched
credit position over time. We divided the parents into four groups: those
that were in excess limitation during the three year time period under
consideration, those that were always in excess credit, those that moved from
excess credit to excess limitation during the time period and those that
transited from excess limitation to excess credit. To classilS' firms into these
cells we first determined their credit status in the two even years and then
checked for the presence of foreign tax credit carryforwards in the most
recent year of the sample under consideration. For example, a firm that was
in excess limitation in 1984 and 1986 that did not claim a foreign tax credit
carryforward in 1986 was placed in the 0always in excess Iimitation cell.
If the same firm claimed a foreign tax credit carryforward in 1986 it was26
placed in the "transit from excess credit to excess limitation" cell since the
presence of the carryforward indicates that this firm was in excess credit in
the previous year. Using this methodology we developed what should be
considered floor estimates of the extent to which firms switched credit
position.21 We present both unweighted estimates and figures that are
weighted by assets and foreign source income for the last even year of each
sample.
Table 5demonstratesthat a significant number of firms transited
both into and out of excess credit during the 1980s. At least 37 percent of
parents switched states in each of our three samples and this figure increased
over time to reach 46 percent in the 1984-1986 time period. A similar story
emerges when these numbers are weighted by assets or foreign source
income. In each of the sample periods under consideration, at least 37
percent of assets and 41 percent of foreign source income was associated
with parents that switched credit positions. During the 1984-1986 time
period more than half of foreign source income was generated by parents
that changed credit position? These results indicate that, as pointed out
in Section III, it may not be correct to specify the tax price for dividend
remittances as taking on one of two values depending on the credit position
of the parent firm in thatyear. An expected tax price is the more
appropriate concept when the credit position may change. We will return to
this issue below when we discuss the specification and estimation ofour
dividend equation.
V.3The Tax Consequences of Dividend Remittances
We now focus more closely on the tax implications of the dividend
remittances of the CFCs in our sample. We ignore for the time being the
use of foreign tax credit carryovers, so the tax price of a dividendpayment27
to the parent corporation takes on the values derived in Section ilL Even
with this restriction, we find strong evidence that U.S. corporations in our
sample were coordinating the level and source of dividend payments from
their CFCs so as to reduce their U.S. and foreign tax liabilities.
We would expect the probability that a CFC pays a dividend to its
parent, and the amount of any dividend paid, to depend on the effect the
payment would have on the total tax liability of the CFC and the parent. For
each CFC in the sample, we calculated the effect a dividend remittance from
that CFC to its parent would have on tax payments by the CFC and its
parent given the parent's foreign tax credit position in the absence of any
dividend remittance from that CFC. For CFCs that paid no dividend in
1986, this calculation was simple, since the tax price of the dividend
payment would depend on the actual excess credit position of the parent.
For CFCs that did pay a dividend, this calculation involved computing what
the foreign tax credit position of the parent would have been if the dividend
had not been paid.
Table 6 summarizes the impact of dividend remittances on tax
payments for the CFCs in our sample for which we calculate an average tax
rate? We partition the data into two groups of CFCs: (1) those CFCs
with parents that had positive U.S. taxable income; and (2) those CFCs with
parents that had U.S. tax losses. For each group, the table shows the
number of CFCs, the number paying dividends, the percent paying
dividends, the total amount of CFC dividend payments, and the ratios of
CFC dividend payments to CFC earnings and assets, respectively.
In the first six rows of the table, those CFCs that had U.S. parents
with taxable U.S. income are partitioned by whether a dividend payment
from them to their parent would have increased, left unchanged, or
decreased tax payments. The first three of these rows consider only the28
effect of a dividend payment on the U.S. tax liabilities of the parent
company. Comparing the percent of CFCs paying dividends and the average
payout ratios across the different categories yields striking results. It appears
that tax incentives strongly affected whether a multinational chose to receive
dividend remittances from a CFC. About 29.4 percent of all CFCs paid a
dividend, but only 19.0 percent of those CFCS from whom dividend
payments would have increased U.S. tax liabilities actually paid dividends,
while 31.3 percent of those CFCs whose dividend payments would not have
changed U.S. tax liabilities and 39.0 percent of those CFCs whose dividends
would have decreased U.S. tax liabilities did pay dividends?° And tax
incentives affected the amount of dividend payments as a percentage of CFC
earnings or assets even more than they affected the number of CFCs paying
dividends. In particular, the sixth column of the table shows that the ratio
of dividend payments to assets for those CFCs whose dividend payments
increased U.S. taxes was only 1.4 percent, while this ratio was 4.1 percent
and 4.4 percent for CFCs whose dividend payments did not change or
decreased U.S. taxes, respectively. The seventh column presents similar
results for the ratio of dividend payments to CFC earnings. The fifth
column shows that these CFC dividend payments generated little U.S. tax
revenue; only 8.1 percent of the total dividend payments increased U.S.
taxes at all, compared to 17.0 percent of the payments which actually
decreased U.S. taxes.
The next three rows of Table 6 partition CFCs by the effect of
dividend payments on global--i.e. both U.S. and source country--tax
liabilities. Taxes still appear to have had a strong influence on dividend
remittance patterns, but the U.S. multinationals bore some taxes on 51.2
percent of these income flows. This occurs because remittances from CFCs
with parents in excess credit often create a source country withholding tax29
liability which is not offset by a reduction in U.S. taxes, since the
withholding tax payment just creates more excess foreign tax credits.3'
However, comparing the proportions of CFCs paying dividends and CFC
payout ratios yields a similar result to when only U.S. tax liabilities are
considered: CFCs appear to have been far more likely to pay dividends and
to pay larger dividends if those dividends bore a negative, or zero, tax price.
Remarkably, 35.6percentof CFC dividend payments appear to have
decreased global tax liabilities for their U.S. parent corporations.
The last three rows of Table 6 present results for CFCs with parents
that had tax losses and therefore no U.S. taxes to pay. Our sample has
1,066 of such CFCs, as compared to 3,339 CFCS with parents having
positive taxable income. Remittances from these CFCs do not incur any
U.S. tax because the foreign taxable income they represent is offset by
domestic (or foreign branch) tax losses. Because there is no current U.S.
tax liability, any foreign tax credit on the remitted income cannot be taken
currently, but it may be carried forward or back to other tax years.
We might expect large remittances of income from low-tax CFCs
in this situation, since the parent pays no additional U.S. tax currently, but
the results in Table 6 contradict this intuition. Those CFCs paid out little in
relation to their income and assets. For example, as a group these CFCs
paid out only 26.4 percent of their earnings, compared to 39.6 percent for
those. CFCs that had parents with positive taxable income.Particularly
puzzling is the result that low-tax CFCs paid out less than high-tax CFCs,
since firms making losses save U.S. tax when they receive dividends from
low-tax CFCs but not when they receive them from high-tax CFCs.
These results may not be as puzzling as they at first seemed to us,
since a plausible tax motivation exists for CFCs to pay out less when their
U.S. parents are making losses. When the parent receives a dividend from30
a CFC in this situation, it gives up a loss deduction that, according to U.S.
tax rules, can be carried back to past years or forward to future years to
offset taxable income and reduce taxes. In exchange for the foregone loss
carryover, the parent saves the additional U.S. tax that would otherwise
accrue immediately on the foreign income it repatriates. The parent also
acquires excess foreign tax credits in the amount of the foreign tax paid or
deemed paid on the remitted income. Together, the current savings in U.S.
tax and the excess foreign tax credit are equal in dollar value to the loss
carryover that the firm gives up. However, according to U.S. tax law, the
loss deduction can be carried back up to three years and forward up to
fifteen years, while the foreign tax credit can be carried back only two years
and forward only five years. The foreign tax credit carryover is therefore
much more likely to expire unused than is the loss carryover.U.S.
multinationals may be reluctant to give up a loss carryover that they would
probably be able to use at some point in the future in exchange for a smaller
immediate tax gain and a foreign tax credit carryover that is more likely to
expire unused. However, the result that low-tax CFCs pay out less than
high-tax CFCs in this situation remains a puzzle.
V.4Estimates of the Relationship Between Dividend Remittances
and their Tax Price
The results reported in Tables 3 through 6 suggest that taxation may
have an important influence on dividend remittance patterns, but they do not
allow us to gauge whether tax incentives are significant when other factors
are taken into account. To do that we estimated dividend equations of the
following basic form:
D =a0+a1TAX+cv2Y1+j3'X+ + e, (19)31
where D1 denotes the dividend payment of CFC i to its U.S. parent
corporation; TAX1 denotes the tax price of dividend payments from the CFC
to its parent; Y1 denotes CFC after-tax income; X1 is a vector of other CFC
characteristics; X, is a vector of the characteristics of the U.S. parent; and
c is a random error term.
Equation (19) is similar to the dividend equation estimated by Hines
and Hubbard (1990), but our estimates differ in some important ways. As
we have noted, our specification of the tax price variable includes
withholding taxes and takes into account variations in source country
corporate income taxation systems. In addition, in some of our estimates we
include an additional tax price variable designed to reflect expectedtaxprice
effects. We attempt to capture the possibility that the parent firm's excess
credit position could change in the future and that the use of foreign tax
credit carryovers could change the tax consequences of current dividend
payments. We assume that the larger the parent firm's excess credit
position, if it is in excess credit, or the greater its deficit of credits, if it is
in excess limitation, relative to its total foreign source income, the less likely
it will be to change credit position during the period when carryovers could
be used. This led us to the following dividend equation:





and OTAX1 denotes the tax price of a dividend remittance if the parent which
is currently in excess credit (excess limitation) were instead in excess
limitation (excess credit); FFC denotes the current total excess credit or32
excess limitation of the parent; and FSI denotes the parent's total foreign
source income from all sources.
Although ad hoc, this specification has three attractive properties.
To illustrate this, note that if the probability of switching credit position is
F, so that the expected tax price is




Given this interpretation, the first attractive property of the specification is
that a1 represents the effect of the erpected tax price no matter what value
P takes on. The second attractive property is that as F1'CfFSIgets large,--
i.e., as the parent goes further into excess credit or excess limitation and is
therefore less likely to move out of that state in the near future--ETAX, and
hence P, gets small and eventually approaches zero. The thirdproperty is
that as the foreign tax credit position, FTC, approacheszero, P approaches
a fixed number, cy2/a1.
Since over 70 percent of the CFCs in the samplepay no dividends
at all, the dividend equations were estimated using a tobit model. The
columns of Table 7 report estimates of six different versions of the tobit
model. Column (1) presents estimates of the basic dividendequation
including the tax price variable, CFC earnings and CFCage measured by the
number of years since incorporation. To control for variations in CFC size,
CFC dividend remittances and earnings are divided by CFC assets. Column
(2) shows estimates of the same equation with the addition of the variable to
capture the expected tax price effect, ETAX. We included the ratio of33
parent company dividends to assets and a set of parent dummy variables, to
capture parent-specific effects, in the estimates reported in column (3).
Column (4) reports estimates of the equation including 59countrydummy
variables. For the estimates shown in column (5), we included CFC interest
paid divided by CFC assets and a dummy variable for the U.S. parent
corporation's excess credit position. Column (6) presents estimates of the
dividend equation with CFC industry dummy variables in addition to the
country dummy variables.
The estimated tax price effects on CFC dividend remittances are
negative and significant in each model suggesting that the larger the tax price
of receiving dividends from a CFC, the lower the dividend payment from
that CFC will be. Interestingly, adding the expected tax price variable
improves the estimates overall and increases the estimated tax price
coefficient substantially, from -0.058 in column (1) to -0.160 in column (2).
The expected tax price effect appears to be larger and more significant than
the estimated effect of the simple tax price specification used in the column
(1) estimates.
The estimated parameters for the other variables present in these,
and the other, specifications have unsurprising signs. Higher CFC earnings
increase CFC distributions. CFC dividends increase with CFC age, a result
predicted by some models of multinational behavior under taxation with a
foreign tax credit and deferral.32
The estimates shown in column (3) are of interest in light of results
reported in Hines and Hubbard (1990) and Hines (1991). Hines and
Hubbard (1990) found a strong positive relationship between CFC dividend
payments and parent company dividend payments. They suggest that this
relationship may be due to cash flow constraints, since parent firms might
need more internally generated funds when they are making distributions to34
their shareholders. Hines (1991) found a strong positive effect of foreign
earnings in estimates of dividend payout equations for U.S. corporations.
He is uncertain as to the reason for this relationship, but suggests that it is
consistent with a signalling view of dividends. In an earlier version of this
paper, we presented estimates that were consistentwith these earlier
findings: parent dividend payments had a large positive coefficient when
added to our CFC dividend equations. However, the results reported in
column (3) show that when separate parent effects are added to the equation,
the relationship between parent and CFC dividend payments disappears. It
appears that the parent dividend variable may simply have been capturing
some omitted parent characteristics. In any case, the presence or absence
of these, and other, parent variables does not affect the estimated coefficients
on the other variables substantially.
Including country effects in column (4) increases the estimated tax
effect from -0.160 to -0.217. Although not reported in the table, many of
the estimated country effects are significantly different from the omitted
country effect, Canada. For example, significant negative effects were
estimated for the United Kingdom (-0.160), France (-0.073), and the
Netherlands (-0.083). We found no evidence of a strong tax haven effect
independent of the tax price effect. While Hong Kong and the Cayman
Islands have significant negative country effects of -0.097 and -0.158,
respectively, the Netherlands Antilles has a significant positive effect
(0.108), and other tax havens generally have insignificant country effects.
Country risk factors may be evident in the positive country effects on
dividend remittances found for Panama (0.089), South Africa (0.074), and
the Philippines (0.145).
In order to control for differences in CFC capital structure, we
included the ratio of CFC interest payments to CFC assets in the estimates35
reported in column (5)•33Themore debt financed a CFC, the greater its
interest payments and the less funds may be available for dividend payments.
The estimated coefficient on this variable has the expected negative sign, but
it is not statistically significant. Including this variable does not change the
estimated tax price effect.
A potential problem with our estimated tax effects is that they may
measure no more than the fact that CFCs with parents in excess credit paid
larger dividends. To test for this possibility the estimates reported in column
(5)alsoinclude a dummy variable equal to one if the parent is in excess
credit and zero otherwise. While the estimated coefficient on this variable
is positive and significant, the estimated tax price effect reported in column
(5)remainshighly significant and virtually unchanged. from the column (4)
estimate.
Our results are robust to the inclusion of other variables in the
equation. For example, column (6) reports estimates of the dividend
equation containing 27 CFC industry dummy variables in addition to the
country dummy variables!4 The results are largely the same as in the other
estimates.35
We have also estimated these equations including terms that interact
the tax price variables with the CFC earnings variable. Such interactive
terms are frequently included in empirical estimates of dividend equations.
The results from those estimates are qualitatively the same as those presented
in Table 7, although the estimated tax price effects evaluated at the variable
means are actually somewhat larger when the interactive terms are included.
We present the results without the interactive terms because they are
somewhat easier to evaluate visually.
A potential endogeneity problem associated with our tax price
variable becomes apparent if one examines the formulas in Table 1.36
Specifically, the value of the tax price variable depends on the size of the
CFC's dividendpaymentwhen the host country has a split-rate or imputation
tax system. We used instrumental variables estimates to evaluate whether
this is an important problem. We instrumented the tax price variables on
their values evaluated when dividend payments are zero. The instrumental
variables estimates were very close to those reported in Table 7, so it
appears that this source of endogeneity in the tax variable is not important.
The results reported in Table 7 show that the tax price of a dividend
remittance has a significant negative impact on CFC dividend remittances.
The estimates from columns (4) and (5)indicatethat at the mean of the
variables an increase in the tax price of 1 percentage point would decrease
the dividend payout ratio by about .054 percentage points, which translates
into approximately a 1.5 percent decrease in dividend payments. This effect
may not seem large, but given that the tax price of remittances varied
enormously across CFCs within the sample, from less than -300percentto
over 50 percent, the estimates indicate that tax incentives did have dramatic
impacts on dividend remittance patterns.
As explained above, one can calculate implied values for the
probability of switching credit position from our estimates. When the stock
of excess credits equals zero, an estimate of this probability is given by the
coefficient on the expected tax price variable. Using the parameter estimate
from our preferred specifications in columns (4), (5)and(6) the implied
probability of switching credit position is around 0.62. This probability may
seem large, but considered in light of the substantial shifts in credit position
shown in Table 5 it appears to be more reasonable. In particular note that
Table S shows that at least 46 percent of the parent corporations switched
credit position during the period from 1984 to 1986. Over the seven year
period around 1986 during which excess credits could be carried back or37
forward the percentage of firms switching credit position would probably be
a lot higher.
Our results appear to suggest a greater and more significant tax
price effect on dividend remittances than found by Hines and Hubbard
(1990) in their estimates of a similar equation. This may be due to our
improved specification of the tax price variable or to differences in the data
used.
Caution should be exercised in interpreting the estimated coefficients
on ourtaxprice variable. These estimates do not necessarily show the effect
of tax policy changes on the aggregate level of dividend remittances from
CFCs. What the figures show is that firms tend to structure their CFC
dividend remittances so that they minimize taxes at the margin. If, given the
income flows from other sources, the tax price of a dividend remittance from
a particular CFC to its U.S. parent is low, our results suggest that the U.S.
parent is more likely to receive a dividend payment from that CFC. But the
tax price of a dividend remittance from one CFC will frequently depend on
the foreign income its U.S. parent receives from other CFCs, foreign
branches, and other sources. Since we have not estimated the parameters of
a model that would simultaneously determine the levels of all of these
income flows, our estimates will not capture all the effects of policy changes
on aggregate dividend remittances.
VI. SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS
Our results suggest that U.S. corporations are able to manipulate the
flows of income from their CFCs in order to reduce the global tax on their
foreign source income. They are able to take advantage of deferral and the
overall limitation on the foreign tax credit to avoid paying much U.S. tax on38
their foreign income) The incentives for tax avoidance distort the timing
and the source of remittances of income from abroad.
The fact that U.S. multinational corporations avoid paying much
U.S. tax on foreign source income is not necessarily in conflict with U.S.
policy goals to the extent that it merely reflects high foreign taxes paid by
U.S. corporations on their foreign source income. The foreign tax credit is,
after all, meant to relieve double taxation. However, our results indicate
that the low U.S. tax payments on this income are not merely the result of
uniformly high foreign tax rates.Instead, they appear to arise to a
significant extent from the ability of U.S. firms to cross-credit between
different sources of income within the overall limitation on the foreign tax
credit. In addition to lowering U.S. tax revenues, this may also affect the
extent to which the tax system preserves capital export neutrality. With
cross-crediting, firms with excess credits have a tax incentive to invest in
low-tax countries rather than in the U.S. or elsewhere thereby violating
capital export neutrality. However, ignoring the effects of deferral, cross-
crediting may tend to preserve capital export neutrality for firms in excess
limitation because the tax consequences of earning income in high-tax
countries and low-tax countries are the same. Whether this is, or should be,
compatible with U.S. policy goals is an open question.
The current policy implications of our results should be qualified by
the major changes in the tax law that have occurred since 1986. The Tax
Reform Act of 1986 tightened up on the use of cross-crediting by increasing
the number of separate limitation baskets. Our results indicate that the
concerns that led to these further restrictions on cross-crediting were
justified, whatever the merits of the particular measures that were adopted.
The 1986 Act also lowered the U.S. corporate income tax rate substantially,
which may have caused a much greater portion of the foreign source income39
of U.S. multinationals to generate excess credits. Another possible limitation
of this analysis is that 1986 may have been an anomalous year due to the
anticipation of the tax law changes that took effect over the following two
years. Slemiod (1990b) presents balance of payments data suggesting that
there were such effects on multinational income flows in 1986. We plan to
investigate the anticipatory impacts and subsequent effects of the 1986 tax
legislation by linking our 1986 data to data from earlier and later years when
the first multinational tax data from the period following 1986 become
available.40
ENDNOTES
1. These figures are from the latest tax return data available as
presented in Redmiles (1990).
2. The focus here is on the exploitation of opportunities for legal tax
avoidance; we do not examine enforcement issues such as those relating to
transfer pricing.
3. The source country may also collect revenue through sales taxes or
a VAT. Some of the burden of these taxes may be borne by the foreign
operation of the U.S. company.
4. The U.S. tax base can differ from the tax base as defined by the
host government for a variety of reasons. For example, the amount of
interest deductions allowed, depreciation schedules and inflation rates may
differ in host and home countries. Hines (1989) and Leechor and Mintz
(1990) show that these differences can have important incentive effects.
5. Upuntil 1976, U.S. taxpayers could elect to apply their limitation
either on a global basis or on a per country basis. The per country limitation
was eliminated in 1976.
6. This ignores the possible effects of deferral in violating capital
export neutrality.
7. This discussion ignores the role of deferral. Taking deferral into
account, Hartman (1985) argues that capital export neutrality holds neither
for excess limitation firms nor for excess credit firms. He argues that only
the host country tax matters for foreign investment financed through foreign
subsidiary retained earnings. His insight is that the taxes paid to the U.S.
government upon repatriation of foreign earnings decrease both the
opportunity cost of investment (reduced dividends in his case) and the return
to investment by the same amount and are therefore irrelevant to marginal
investment decisions.
8. A DISC (Domestic International Sales Corporation) is a corporation
through which U.S. companies can generate export sales. DISCs were
created in 1971 to provide a tax incentive to U.S. exporters. Companies
which set up DISCs were allowed to defer a portion of the U.S. tax due on
export income.41
9. In 1984, Congress effectively replaced the DISCprogram with the
FSC (Foreign Sales Corporation) rules. FSCs are a special class of
corporations which are eligible to receive an exemption from U.S. taxation
on a portion of export income.
10. See, for example, Price Waterhouse (1991) and Tillinghast (1990).
11. Except for the time value of the additional tax paid this year that
will be offset by a reduction in tax next year.
12. Alworth expresses the tax cost of dividend remittances in the form
of the opportunity cost of retained earnings.
13. For the countries in our sample, withholding tax rates on dividends
range from zero to 55percent.
14. Germany's corporate tax system is actually a hybrid of a split-rate
and an imputation system; however, since Germany provides no refunds of
tax on distributions of profits to foreign direct investors, the imputation part
of the system does not apply for our purposes.
15. As noted above, Germany has a split-rate system coupled with its
imputation credit.
16.There are exceptions. For example, Brazil does not allow the
deductibility of royalty payments from Brazilian companies to related foreign
parties.
17. Financial companies face some different tax rules and they generally
operate in other countries through branches rather than subsidiaries. For
these reasons financial companies were omitted from the analysis.
18. The firms in our sample were drawn from the sample collected by
the Statistics of Income Division of the Internal Revenue Service. This
sample is created by including all U.S. corporations with assets that
exceeded $50 million and a subset of U.S. corporations with smaller asset
size. A complete description of the sampling technique used by the Internal
Revenue Service can be found in the 1986 Statistics of Income Corporation
Income Tax Returns volume.42
19. Since we are primarily concerned with CFC income repatriations we
eliminated from our sample parents that did not have general limitation
income and parents that did not own any CFCs. The original sample
contained 1,817 non-financial parent corporations. More than half of those
eliminated from our study had no CFCs (1,101) the remainder had either not
filed a foreign tax credit form (97) or had no general limitation basket
foreign source income (2). Removing multinationals that did not control any
CFCs from our sample resulted in only a 7% reduction in general limitation
basket foreign source income.
20. These percentages are calculated for parents with positive worldwide
income.
21. This result is possibly of limited significance for agriculture, since
there is only one corporation in that industry present in our sample.
Confidentiality considerations required us to report the figures for that
corporation grouped with the transportation industry, which faced a similar
average U.S. tax rate on its foreign source income.
22. The total foreign source income in this table is smaller than in Table
2 for at least two reasons.First, foreign sources of income other than
CFCs, such as branch operations, are not included. Second, the sample of
CFCs does not necessarily represent all the CFCs of the U.S. firms in the
sample.
23. The analysis in Goodspeed and Frisch (1989) also suggests that
parents average across income sources. They calculate average tax rates on
all types of foreign source income in the general limitation basket by country
using 1984 data. They find that the effective tax rate on dividends was high
while the effective tax rate on interest and other forms of deductible income
repatriations was low. Comparing these effective tax rates with country
specific average tax rates suggests that parents cross-credit over foreign
source income types.
24.This will not always be true because we are ignoring the
withholding tax rates and variations in foreign corporate tax systems here
that we account for below.
25. The figures presented in Table 4 probably underestimate the
potential for cross crediting in concurrent dividend payments and its use.
This is because our sample does not include all the CFCs of each parent firm43
for two reasons. First, as explained above, only the largest 7,500 CFCs
were included in the sample, Second, as explained in the text and in
Appendix B, some CFCs were dropped from the sample becauseaverage tax
rates could not be calculated for them.
26. The figures reported in this paragraph are not presented in a table.
27. To divide the firms into the four cells that appear in Table 5 we
used the following methodology. For simplicity, we use the 1984-1986 time
period as an example. Firms that were in excess credit in 1984 and 1986
that had foreign tax credit carryforwards in 1986 were placed in the "always
in excess credit" cell. Firms that were in excess limitation in 1984 and 1986
that did not have foreign tax credit carryforwards in 1986 were placed in the
"always in excess limitation" cell. The set of firms that were in excess
credit in 1984 and in excess limitation in 1986 were determined to have
transited out of an excess credit state over the time period. We added to this
group (the "transit from excess limitation to excess credit" cell) firms that
were in excess limitation in both even years that had foreign tax credit
carryforwards in 1986. The final cell, "transit from excess limitation to
excess credit", contains the following two groups of firms: those in excess
limitation in 1984 and in excess credit in 1986 and those in excess credit in
1984 and 1986 that had no foreign tax credit carryforwards in 1986.
28. Since the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 may have made
1986 an anomalous year, we also weighted the figures in Table 5 for the
1984-1986 time period by foreign source income in 1984. In 1984, the total
foreign source income of corporations in the sample was $37.5 billion. The
proportion of foreign source income associated with parents remaining in the
same credit position was 54.0 percent; 12.7 percent of foreign source income
belonged to parents that remained in excess limitation and 41.3 percent was
associated with parents that remained in excess credit. The remaining
proportion of foreign source income belonged to parents that switched credit
positions; 24.1 percent transited to an excess credit position and 21.9 percent
transited to an excess limitation position.As Table 5 shows, these
percentages do differ from those weighted by foreign source income in 1986.
This may have been a result of anticipatory behavior on the part of U.S.
corporations in response to the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
29. A small group of CFCs with extremely high (above ninety percent)
calculated average tax rates were eliminated from the sample used to
generate the results in Tables 6 and 7 because they appeared to be outliers.44
30. A question arose as to how to classify those CFCs that paid a
dividend that was large enough to change the foreign tax credit position of
the parent. We opted to classify CFCs by the tax consequence of the first
dollar of dividend payment made. Few enough CFCs in this position were
in the sample that the results were not significantly changed by classifying
CFCs by the tax consequence of the last dollar of dividend payment made.
31. Remittances from some CFCs incur a positive or zero U.S. tax
liability but a negative global tax liability. This can occur because host
country taxes are reduced by distributions of profits in countries with split
rate systems. The ACT credit in the U.K. also decreases global tax when
the firm is in excess credit.
32. Including Newlon (1987) and Sinn (1990).
33. Since CFC interest payments are an endogenous variable, it would
be best to instrument them on some exogenous variable. However, we could
not find suitable instrumental variables in our data.
34. These dummy variables were created using groupings of the IRS
SOl industry classifications which correspond fairly closely to two-digit SIC
classifications.
35. We have also estimated the same equation with parent industry
effects, but the results were not significantly different from those reported
in Table 7.
36. The income does bear shareholder level taxes when it is distributed
to the U.S. parent corporation's own shareholders.45
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APPENDIX A: Derivation of Tax Prices for Non-Classical Corporate
Income Tax Systems
In this appendix we present the derivations of the tax prices for
dividend payments from CFCs in countries with split-rate and imputation
corporate income tax systems.
A.]Tax Prices under Split-Rate Systems
Under split-rate systems there are different corporate tax rates for
undistributed and distributed profits, denoted in the text as r and Td,
respectively.The total tax paid by CFC i to its country of residence before
withholding taxes is
= - D1)+
whereY1 denotes the CFC's pre-tax income, and D1 denotes its dividend
payment to its U.S. parent corporation. Let r1 represent the source country
average tax rate on the CFC's distributed and undistributed profits before
withholding taxes, equal to T11Y1, which is the tax rate used for the dividend
gross up and foreign tax credit calculation. If the parent is in excess credit,
there is no additional U.S. tax to pay on dividends, and so the tax price of
a dividend remittance must be zero. If the parent is in excess limitation the
U.S. tax payable on the dividend remittance is
T5 =D1{(r-rj/(1-ij)-w1}.
where to1representsthe source country withholding tax rate on dividend
payments out of the country. Differentiating this with respect to D1 yields
the U.S. tax price of dividend remittances when the parent is in excess
limitation:
dT5/dD1 =(r-r.J/(l-T.)-w+ (DI/Y.J(r-rd)(l-r)/(l-Tj2.49
The global tax liability created by a dividend remittance is the sum
of the U.S. and the foreign tax liabilities.If the parent is in excess
limitation, that sum is equal to
T0 =(rd-riD1+D1(r-r.)I(I-rj.
The global tax price is then
dT0/dD1 =- r+(r-rj/(1-rj+ (Dl/Ya(TM..ra(1-T)/(l-7a2.
For a parent in excess credit, the global tax liability associated with the
dividend payment is simply
T0 =(r4-r+cojD1,
so the tax price is
dT0/dD1 =- r+to1.
A.2Tax Prices under the U.K. Imputation System
Under the U.S.-U.K. tax treaty, the tax credit provided to U.S.
shareholders for Advanced Corporation Tax (ACT) on distributed profits is
one half of the credit given domestic shareholders. The United Kingdom
applies its withholding tax to both the dividend payment and the ACT credit.
The United States considers the tax credit paid to be part of the grossed-up
dividend. In addition, for foreign tax credit purposes the United States treats
the reduction by one half in the credit given to U.S. shareholders as an
additional payment of U.K. corporate income tax by the U.K. CFC.
Denoting the tax credit given to U.S. shareholders for ACT as 01,




where c1 is the rate of tax on undistributed profits. Taxes deemed by the
United States to have been paid by the CFC before withholding taxes are
=cY1+ 01D1.50
The average U.K. tax rate used for the dividend gross up and the foreign tax
credit is
=T3,/Y1.
Given these definitions, we can derive the U.S. tax liability on a
dividend payment form a U.K. CFC after the foreign tax credit. If the U.S.
parent corporation is in excess credit, the U.S. tax liability is zero. If the
parent is in excess limitation, the U.S. tax liability is
T5 =(1+01)D1{(r-ra/(l-r1) -w;}
Differentiating this expression produces the tax price of dividend remittances
when the parent is in excess limitation:
dT5/dD1 =(1÷Oa{(r-r.J/(l-r1) --
Theglobal tax liability created by the dividend payment for a parent
in excess credit is
T0 ={(1+oaw; -
andthe corresponding tax price is
dT0/dD =(1+O.Jw -8.
The global tax liability for a parent in excess limitation is
=(1+OjD(r-r.J/(1-rO -
andthe associated tax price is
dT6/dD1 =(1 -F O.j{(r-r1)/(1-r1)-01(D1IYa(1-r)I(I-rj2}-O.51
APPENDIXB: Data Issues
B.1Problems in Imputing CFC Specific Average Tax Rates from
Tax Return Data
Calculating the tax price of dividend repatriations from the
subsidiary information return (Form 5471) often requires more information
than is reported. This is the case for CFCs that report negative earnings and
profits, receive tax refunds from host countries, repatriate dividends in
excess of current earnings and profits, and receive remittances from their
own subsidiaries. As described below, to reduce measurement errors, we
eliminated CFCs in some of these situations from our analysis. In other
instances we opted to include observations after careful analysis.
We eliminated two groups of CFCs that are apt to have truegross
up rates that differ from average foreign tax rates. The first group were
CFCs with negative earnings and profits. For these CFCs, the rate used to
gross up dividends for the purpose of the foreign tax credit is the rate that
applied when the earnings from which dividends are distributed were
generated. No information on this rate is available since it is a function of
past tax rates.
Mother problem arose due to the existence of negative CFC foreign
income tax payments. CFCs may receive tax refunds from host countries
which reduce tax payments on current earnings and profits. This causes no
problem for the imputation of average tax rates for CFCs that paid positive
foreign taxes but leaves us with an indeterminate gross up rate for CFCs
with negative foreign income tax payments. Since there is insufficient
information to impute a tax rate we also eliminated CFCs in this situation.
There are two nuances in the tax law that complicate the calculation
of the gross up rate for CFCs. First, prior to 1987, if a CFC's dividend52
payment exceeded its current year after-tax profits, then the excess was
considered to have been distributed from the accumulated profits of previous
years, starting with the next previous year and proceeding backwards. The
gross up rate on the excess remittance is therefore calculated based on the
foreign taxes that were paid on those prior year profits. Second, if a CFC
itself receives dividend payments from a subsidiary of its own--termed a
"lower-tier CFC"--then any dividend payment from the "first-tier" CFC to
its U.S. parent is considered to be paid proportionately out of its own profits
and the profits of the lower-tier CFC. Therefore, the gross up rate is based
on a weighted average of the average tax rates of the first-tier CFC and the
lower-tier CFC, with the weights determined by the fraction of the first-tier
CFC's profits accounted for by the dividend from the lower-tier CFC. After
careful analysis, we chose to include in our sample CFCs in both of these
situations. Imputed average tax rates were calculated by dividing current
year tax payments by current year earnings and profits. A description of the
procedures we used to determine if the inclusion of these two groups of
CFCs caused any bias in our results is contained in Sections B.2. 1 and B.2.2
of this appendix.
In summary, we included in our sample CFCs that received
dividend payments from lower-tier CFCs and CFCs that paid out dividends
in excess of current year earnings and profits. Excluded from our sample
are CFCs that made negative foreign income tax payments and CFCs that
reported negative earnings and profits. Our sample consisted of 340 parents
with positive worldwide income. These corporations owned 4,475 CFCs
with assets large enough to be included in the top 7,500 CFCs. Of this
group of CFCs, 884 had negative earnings and profits and 159 received tax
refunds from host countries. Eliminating these CFCs resulted in a decrease
of 601 million dollars of dividend remittances. These omissions accounted53
for tess than5%of the almost 13 billion dollars of dividendpayments from
CFCs to parents included in the sample. Our sample was madeup of the
remaining 3,410 CFCs of which 333 paid out dividends in excess of current
earnings and profits and 420 received dividends from lower-tier CFCS.
Dividend remittances total 12.3 billion dollars; 2.8 million dollars of
dividends were remitted from CFCs that paid out dividends abovecurrent
earnings and profits and 6.2 million dollars of dividends were remitted from
CFCs receiving dividend payments from lower-tier CFCs.
13.2Potential Sources of Bias
8.2.1 CFCs that received dividends from lower-tier subsidiaries
CFCs receiving dividends from lower-tier CFCsmay or may not
remit dividends to U.S. parent corporations. To determine whether dividend
remittance patterns differed between CFCs with lower-tier remittances and
those without, we separated from the sample those CFCs for which tower-
tier dividend payments comprised more than 10% of earnings and profits.
We then generated Tables 3-6 for both samples and compared the results.
Although CFCs that received substantial amounts of dividends from lower-
tier CFCs were more likely to make dividend payments to U.S. parents and
paid out more dividends, we found that the relationship between tax prices
and dividend payments did not differ across the two samples. As a result we
included in our tabulation and econometric work all CFCs that derived
income from lower-tier dividend payments.
8.2.2 CFCs that paid out dividends in excess of current year after-tax
profits
CFCs that paid out dividends in excess of current earnings and
profits are also a potential source of measurement error. We compared54
tabulations for this group of CFCs to all other CFCs paying dividends and
determined that including this set of CFCs did not systematically bias our
results.Table I
The Tax Price of Dividend Repatriations
U.S. Tax Price Global Tax Price
Under Classical Tax Systems
Excess limitation parent (r-r)/(1 -r)-w (r-r1)/(1-r)
Excess credit parent 0
Under Split Rate Tax Systems
Excess limitation parent (r-r) ((I -rJ-w1 + (D/Y)(rU-rd)( 1 -r) 1(1 -r)2 (r-r1)1( 1 -ri)+Td-;+
(D1tY)fr-r4)( 1r)/(1iJ2
Excess credit parent 0 Td7u+W
UnderImputation Tax Systems
Excess limitation parent (1 + O) ((r-r1)/( 1 —r)—W—O(D/Y1)( 1 -r)/( I rJ2} (1 + Oa{(r—'r1)/( 1 —ri) —
01(D11Y1)(1 —r)/(1—rj2}—O
Excess credit parent 0 (1 +O1)co-O1
Note:These tax prices should be adjusted to take into consideration the ability of U.S. corporations tocarry back and/or carry forward excess
foreign tax credits. Dividend remittancesthat increasethe amountby which a corporation is in excess limitation (i.e., withpositivetax prices)
may be used in the future to absorb excess credits ii the corporation transits to an excess credit position within the next two years. Therefore
tile tax price given wilt be an overestimateofthe expected tax price. Dividend remittances that decrease the amount by which acorporation
is in excess limitation have a negative current tax price which may underestimatetheexpected tax price if future periods are taken into
consideration. Similarly, the current tax price of a repatriation that increases (decreases) the amountby which a parent is in excess credit may
be an underestimate (overestimate) of the expected tax price if the corporation can absorb creditsthrough carrybacks.Table 2
TaxPaymcnts of U.S. Parent Corporations in the Sample
(dollarsinmillions)
U.S. Taxes Average U.S.
Number of Total U.S. Total U.S. Foreign Paid on ForeignTax Rate on
U.S. Parent Taxable Taxes Source Source Foreign Source
Corporations Assets Income Paid Income Income Income
By industry of parent:
Mining 9 10,482 1,121 105 934 2 0.2%
Construction S 15,009 163 9 148 0 0.0%
Manufacturing 243 1,471,945 63,531 10,425 43,283 1,014 23%
Transportation 28 201,628 7,132 1,842 1,463 487 33.3%
Retail Trade 38 lfl,646 6,907 2,228 1,047 41 3.9%
Services 17 48,186 1,294 232 412 41 10.0%
By credit position:
Excess limitation 212 971,325 38,294 9,656 14,697 1,585 10.8%
Excess credit 128 968,571 41,853 5,185 32,589 0 0.0%
Total 340 1,939,8% 80,147 14,840 47,286 1,585 3.4%
Note:
We combined the agriculture and transportation industries to preserve the confidentiality of the tax return information.
These two industries have similar average U.S. tax rates on their foreign source income.Table 3







CFCs Assets Earnings DividendsandRoyaltiesIncome Total
U.S. Parent in Excess Limitation:
Total 1,827 122,683 11,514 2,658 1,182 1,093 4,933
with foreigntaxrate
less than 20% 659 51,306 5,244 918 326 815 2,059
20—30% 170 13,326 1,385 345 152 69 565
30 —40% 286 20,151 1,662 434 189 49 671
40 —50% 443 22,125 2,233 688 295 95 1,078
50—60% 165 10,233 820 198 131 40 369
greaterlhan6o% 104 5,542 171 76 89 26 191
U.S.Parent in Excess credit:
Total 1,583 221,454 19,780 9,650 3,843 1,499 14,993
with foreign tax rate
less than 20% 593 72,433 7,689 2,721 539 1,050 4,311
20—30% 163 24,757 1,594 1,202 193 83 1,479
30 —40% 275 36,036 3,875 1,232 895. 98 2,225
40 —50% 325 51,751 4,397 2,524 1,773 183 4,479
50 —60% 142 20.005 1,568 1,190 384 30 1,605
greater than 60% 85 --16,472-657 781 59 55 895Table 4
The Potcntial for and Extent of Cross Crediting inCFC Dividend Remittancesto U.S. Parent Corporationsin the Sample
Percent of Dividends
PercentNumberTotal Numberreceived Percent of
of TotalReceiving Receiving (dollarsTotal Dividends
NumberNumberDividendsDividends in millions) Received
Total U.S. Parent Corporations: 290 100.0% 204 100.0% 12,267 100.0%
U.S. Parents with both bigh and low tax CECs: 212 73.1% 171 83.8% 11,905 97.0%
with dividends received from both high and low tax CFCs111 38.3% 111 54.4% 11,488 93.7%
with dividends received only from high tax CFCs 34 11.7% 34 16.7% 196 1.6%
with dividends received only from low tax CECs: 26 9.0% 26 12.7% 220 1.8%
and the parent has FTC carryforwards 11 3.8% 11 5.4% 146 12%
Note:
CFCs with average foreign tax rates greater than or equal to the U.S. statutory corporate rate in 1986 (46%) are classified as "high tax"
CFCs. All other CECs for which an average foreign tax rate can be calculated are "low tax" CFCs.Table 5
Foreign Tax Credit State Transitions of U.S. Multinationals
Percent Percent Percent Percent
Transit from Transit from Always in Always in
Excess CredittoExcess Limitation to Excess Excess
Years Totals ExcessLimitation
Number of




449 14.3% 22.9% 53.2% 9.6%







1,701,751 12.3% 26.9% 49.7% 11.1%
1982—1984 1,809,922 21.4% 16.4% 34.7% 27.6%
1984—1986 1,766,597 14.2% 34.1% 33.6% 18.1%




20,931 13.2% 34.4% 38.4% 14.0%
1982—1984 43,671 20.2% 21.7% 18.0% 40.1%
1984—1986 40,563 10.2% 42.5% 11.9% 35.4%
Notes: 1. Firms must have positive taxable income in both even years to be in each sample.
2. Weightedfiguresare weighted by assets or foreign source income in the last year of each sample period.Table 6
The Tax Consequences of CFC Dividend Rem ittanecsto their U.S. Parent Corporations
Ratio of NumberPercent of CFC Percent ofRatio of
of CECs CFCs Dividend Total CFC CFC Cit
Number of Paying Paying payments DividendDividends to Dividends to
CFCs DividendsDividends(dollars in millions)Payments Assets After—tax Earnings
FOR PARENTS WITH
POSITIVE TAXABLE INCOME:
By tax price of dividend:
Increases U.S. taxes 1,014 193 19.0% 992 8.1% 1.4% 13.9%
Does not change U.S. taxes 1,548 485 31.3% 9,186 74.9% 4.1% 46.0%
Decreases U.S. taxes 777 303 39.0% 2,088 17.0% 4.4% 53.4%
Increases global taxes 2,218 623 28.1% 6,279 512% 3.1% 32.0%
Does not change global taxes 252 79 31.3% 1,624 13.2% 3.9% 50.2%
Decreases global taxes 869 279 32.1% 4,364 35.6% 4.4% 53,5%
Total 31339 981 29.4% 12,267 100.0% 3.6% 39.6%
FOR PARENTS WITH TAX LOSSES:
.
LowtaxCFCs 761 107 14.1% 712 71.7% 1.6% 162%
High tax CFCs 305 58 19.0% 281 28.3% 1.8% 28.4%
Total 1,066 165 15.5% 992 100.0% 1.7% 26.4%Table 7
ToUtEstimates of Tax Price Effects on CEC Dividend Remittances
Dependent Variable:
Independent Variable (1) (2)
Ratio of CFCDividends toCFC Assets
(3) (4) (5) (6)
Tax price -0.058 -0.160 -0.135 -0.217 -0.218 -0.216
(0.016)' (0,022)(0.022) (OXJ2S) (0.026) (0.026)
Expected tax price variabl& -0.116 -0.100 -0.136 -0.137 -0.134
(0.016)(0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Ratio of CFC earnings to CIt assets 1.039 1.056 0.944 1.053 1.054 1.046
(0.024) (0.025)(0.024) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Years since CIt incorporation/b 0.035 0.032 0.028 0.039 0.038 0.037
(0.004) (0.004)(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Ratio of parent dividends to parent assets 0.356
(47.63)
Ratio of CFC interest paid to CFC assets -o.iss -0.170
(0.166) (0.167)
Excesscredit dummy 0.023 0.022
(0.01 I) (0.012)
Parent dummies present no no yes no no no
Country dummies present no no no yes yes yes
CFC industry dummies present no no no no no yes
Intercept -0.339 -0.326 -0.410 -0.318 -0.324 -0.371
(0.014) (0.013) (0.159) (0.020) (0.021) (0.030)Table 7 (continued)
Tobit Estimates of Tax Price Effects on CFC Dividend Remittances
Dependent Variable:Ratio of CEC Dividends toCFC Assets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Numberofobservations 3,116 3,116 3,116 3,116 3,116 3116
Log likelihood -1,086 -1,069 -741 -975 -975 -941
Parameter scale factor3 0.2636 0.26 18 0.2520 0.2470 0+2470 0.24 13
Notes: 1. Standard errors are in parentheses.
2. The expected tax price variable is as specified in equation (21).
3. Multiply parameter estimates by the parameter scale factor to obtain slope coefficients.